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Campaign Finance Regulation and the
Marketplace of Emotions
Barry P. McDonald*
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION:
OLD THEORY AND DOCTRINE
III. THE NEW SCIENCE AND MODERN ELECTORAL COMMUNICATIONS
IV. A MORE COHERENT FREE SPEECH MODEL AND DOCTRINE FOR
ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REGULATIONS
V. CONCLUSION
"[I]t is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and
regulate the government. The [public's] passions ought to be controlled and
regulated by the government."
- Publius (Federalist No. 49)1
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge
the Pepperdine Law Review for hosting a symposium in April, 2008, entitled Free Speech and Press
in the Modern Age: Can 2O'h Century Theory Bear the Weight of 21" Century Demands?, at which a
condensed version of this Essay was presented. I also wish to thank Rick Hasen and Robert Pushaw
for providing helpful comments on an outline of my presentation remarks, which formed the core of
this Essay.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison) (discussing the role of the public in resolving
disputes between the various branches of the federal government). With respect to the subject of this
Essay, it might be more appropriately said that those who target the passions of the public to
influence political elections might wisely be subject to reasonable regulation that might not be
necessary were the public's reason being appealed to instead. In her symposium essay, Lillian
BeVier misconceives this theme in asserting that I am "implicitly claiming that political speech that
is animated by emotion instead of reason ought to be susceptible to regulation." Lillian R. BeVier,
Can Freedom of Speech Bear the Twenty-first Century's Weight?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 415, 417 n.ll
(2009). Rather, I am arguing that to the extent political candidates and related groups utilize
sophisticated marketing techniques in their advertising and other communications that are designed
primarily to manipulate voters' emotions rather than appeal to their reason, the government's
interests in placing reasonable regulations on such communications become commensurately
stronger-a principle that modem First Amendment theory and doctrine in this area ought to reflect
as I propose in this Essay.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Symposium encourages its participants to ask whether free speech
theories developed and applied by the United States Supreme Court in the
twentieth century to fashion doctrine in different areas of First Amendment
law remain valid in light of twenty-first century conditions and demands.
The task of this Essay will be to focus on the theoretical model the Court
applies in assessing the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation,
particularly in light of new scientific research regarding the nature of
electoral communications2 and the manner in which they are mentally
received and processed by potential voters. It will conclude that the Court's
model contains extremely questionable premises and assumptions that it has
relied on to justify applying a stringent level of First Amendment protection
to these communications. This stringent protection, in turn, has resulted in
the Court striking down most attempts by the United States Congress and
state legislatures to impose campaign-related spending limits on political
candidates, parties, and interest groups, as well as limits on campaign-related
financial contributions that the Court views as unreasonably low. This
Essay will propose a theoretical model that appears to more accurately
describe the nature and impact of electoral communications, and the level of
free speech protection for those communications which that model might
justify.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION: OLD
THEORY AND DOCTRINE
In its seminal decision in Buckley v. Valeo,3 the Court laid down the
well-known modem paradigm for assessing the constitutionality of
campaign finance regulations: limitations on campaign-related expenditures
are subjected to some form of strict scrutiny and normally struck down,
while limitations on campaign contributions are evaluated under a more
intermediate standard of review and are typically upheld unless the Court
views them as being unreasonably low.T 4 The Buckley Court explained that
2. For purposes of this Essay, I will use the term "electoral communications" to refer to
campaign-related communications directed to potential voters by political candidates and their
campaigns, political parties, and political interest groups that are enabled by campaign-related
contributions and expenditures of money. Not surprisingly, in modem political campaigns the bulk
of such communications consist of political advertising directed to selected audiences, and the fund-
raising activities necessary to sustain such "purchased communications." See infra notes 66-70 and
accompanying text.
3. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770-73 (2008). As Sam
Issacharoff and Pam Karlan have creatively described, such a scheme of unlimited spending
"outflows" supported by limited contribution "inflows" creates unstable campaign "hydraulics"
pursuant to which money of dubious legality pours into the system through any cracks and fissures it
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both campaign-related expenditures and contributions are entitled to strong
First Amendment protection, even though the state's interest in regulating
the latter might often be paramount because of the danger of a quid pro quo
exchange of money for official action (an interest the Court determined did
not justify the regulation of campaign spending).5
This strong First Amendment protection for both campaign expenditures
and contributions, the Court reasoned, was warranted because the
"[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates
are integral to the operation of [our] system of government.",6 Moreover, the
"First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political
expression in order 'to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."' 7 The
Court then observed, citing to a case dealing with allegedly lurid and
indecent magazine stories,8 that while First Amendment protections were
not "confined to 'the exposition of ideas,"' 9 a major purpose of that
amendment was to protect "the free discussion of governmental affairs...
[and] debate on public issues,''  and to help citizens "make informed
choices among candidates for office. ' ' " It viewed these goals as being
essential because "the identities of those who are elected will inevitably
shape the course that we follow as a nation."'" In rejecting the argument
that a cap on campaign expenditures and contributions was simply a
regulation of the manner of expression and thus warranted less scrutiny, the
Court reasoned that "[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or
group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached."' 13 Throughout the rest of its decision, the Court reiterated similar
rationales for giving strong First Amendment protection to campaign-related
spending and contributions, and especially to the former. 14
can create or find. See generally Samuel Isacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999).
5. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-59.
6. Id. at 14.
7. Id.
8. See id. (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948)).
9. Id.
10. Id..
11. Id. at 14-15.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id. at 19.
14. See, e.g., id. at 49 n.55 (asserting that "[d]emocracy depends on a well-informed electorate,
The Court thus justified its approach to assessing the constitutionality of
campaign finance regulations on a "more the better" theory: the notion that
the more electoral communications candidates, their campaigns, political
parties, and interest groups engage in through spending allowed by political
donations, the more political ideas will be exchanged, discussed, and
debated, the more informed the electorate will become, and, presumably, the
better the candidates will be that get elected. In other words, the Court's
theory was based on the premise that unlimited quantities of electoral
communications result in increased public deliberation on ideas, that in turn
produce better informed citizens, that in turn result in better decisions about
candidates for office. The Court has generally adhered to this theory as a
justification for continuing to utilize the Buckley doctrinal framework to
assess the constitutionality of campaign finance regulations today. 5
This theory of what we might call "stimulated democratic deliberation"
(SDD) appears to be a hybrid of two prominent theories that members of the
Court and commentators have espoused to justify constitutional protection
for freedom of expression generally: the marketplace of ideas theory and the
democratic deliberation theory. The marketplace theory derives from Justice
Holmes's famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, 16 where he wrote:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe . . . that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. 7
Under this theory, a free flow and exchange of ideas results in the best
outcome because it is the process most likely to result in "truth," which in
turn is the most secure basis for taking action and presumably implementing
government policy. Moreover, the marketplace of ideas is the best vehicle
for producing truth because those "thoughts" that are powerful enough to be
accepted by society will be the most likely to reflect it. While Justice
Holmes did not explain why he believed the latter proposition to be so, he
did provide a hint when he went on to write that "[o]nly the emergency that
not a citizenry legislatively limited in its ability to discuss and debate candidates and issues"); id. at
57 (explaining that "[t]he First Amendment denies government the power to determine that spending
to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise. In the free society ordained by
our Constitution it is . . . the people . . . who must retain control over the quantity and range of
debate on public issues in a political campaign").
15. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 240-46 (2006) (plurality opinion).
16. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
17. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to
time warrants making any exception to the sweeping command, 'Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.""' In this passage,
Holmes suggests that giving society sufficient time to deliberate on ideas
both true and false, good and bad, will eventually yield "good counsels" on
which society will act, and that will be the most likely to embody truth.
The democratic deliberation theory of free speech is rooted in Justice
Brandeis's famous concurrence in Whitney v. California.19 There, Justice
Brandeis, who had been the only Justice to join Justice Holmes's dissent in
Abrams,2 ° appeared to be elaborating on Holmes's marketplace theory, yet
also seemed to be most concerned with justifying protection for political
speech and truth as opposed to truth generally. As Brandeis stated:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the
arbitrary .... They believed that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth ... [and] that public discussion is a political
duty. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public
discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law ......
Building on Brandeis's concurrence, the twentieth century philosopher
Alexander Meiklejohn crafted the democratic deliberation theory of free
speech which holds that the Free Speech and Press Clauses of the First
Amendment are designed primarily to facilitate democratic self-
governance.22  Thus, political speech receives primary constitutional
protection, together with those processes of communication that are
designed to ensure that all viewpoints relevant to self-governance are heard
and that reasoned deliberation on such issues occurs.23 This theory differs
from the marketplace theory primarily in the subject of constitutional
protection-i.e., political speech versus speech generally-and in a greater
tolerance for regulating societal flows of ideas and information in order to
18. Id. at630-31.
19. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
20. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 631 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
22. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948).
23. See, e.g., id. at 22-27.
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ensure that the ideal conditions for a comprehensive and reasoned public
discussion of issues obtain.24
The Court's SDD theory borrows certain elements of marketplace and
democratic deliberation theory, while at the same time ignoring elements of
both. As to marketplace theory, the SDD theory shares the premise that
flows of speech should be unregulated, and that the "free market" will
ultimately operate to separate the good ideas from the bad. In exalting the
importance of political over other forms of speech that might contribute to
the discovery of truth, however, SDD theory departs from marketplace
theory. With regards to democratic theory, it is this same exaltation of
political over other forms of speech that SDD theory borrows from it. SDD
theory ignores democratic theory, however, in its general reluctance to
permit regulation of clectoral speech in order to enhance its deliberative
quality-such as by permitting limits on personal spending by candidates in
order to address "speech quantity imbalances" that might be caused by
differences in their personal wealth.25
There is one major premise shared by both marketplace and democratic
theory, however, that SDD theory does appear to incorporate. Both
marketplace and democratic theory appear to assume that rational thought,
or the "power of reason" as Justice Brandeis put it, 26 will ultimately govern
democratic decision-making so long as the requisite conditions of free
speech obtain. Justice Holmes spoke of the "ultimate good" being achieved
by a "free trade in ideas," the "power of the thought" to get itself accepted in
the market, and the "correction of evil counsels. ' 27 Besides lauding the
power of reason, Justice Brandeis talked about "deliberative forces"
prevailing over the arbitrary, "public discussion" being a political duty, men
being freed from the "bondage of irrational fears," the founding generation
having "confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied
through the processes of popular government," and the necessity of averting
the evil of falsehoods and fallacies "by the processes of education.,
28
Meiklejohn similarly shared a strong faith in the notion that the American
people would make reasoned and intelligent decisions of self government if
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773-74 (2008); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1978) ("The ancillary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of
candidates competing for elective office . . . is clearly not sufficient to justify . . . infringement of
fundamental First Amendment rights.").
26. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
27. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
376-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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only they were given the freedom to deliberate and the proper conditions
within which to do so.
29
The Court's SDD theory appears to embody a similar assumption that a
free flow of communications from political candidates, campaigns, parties,
and interest groups will result in "better" decisions by voters, in the sense of
producing more reasoned, deliberate, and informed choices of political
representatives who presumably hold views on important issues that are
congruent with theirs. As noted earlier, implicit in SDD theory are at least
three basic assumptions: first, that the greater the quantity of electoral
communications, the more ideas relevant to self-governance will be
exchanged, discussed, and debated; second, that such an enhanced public
discussion of ideas will result in more informed voters; and third, that a
more informed voter will make better decisions about those who "inevitably
shape the course that we follow as a nation., 3 ° In other words, SDD theory
assumes that electoral communications consist mainly of ideas relevant to
self-governance, presumably regarding important issues of the day, and that
voters will receive and mentally process those ideas in a rational way-to
wit, in a way that makes them more knowledgeable about those issues, and
willing to exercise their candidate choices in a manner consistent with their
views about those best able to grapple with them.3' In short, SDD theory
assumes that people largely behave as rational actors in the manner in which
they exercise their voting franchise.
Such an assumption, and the fact Justice Holmes, Justice Brandeis, and
Professor Meiklejohn shared it, is hardly surprising considering that rational
actor models of human behavior, including those applied to voter decision-
making, were popular during much of the twentieth century and remain so
today.32 However, a plethora of recent research in neuroscience, political
psychology, and political science is casting substantial doubt on the accuracy
of such models of voter behavior.3 This research is finding that voters'
emotions and feelings about candidates and political parties play a much
29. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 22, at 25.
30. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976) (asserting that "it is of particular
importance that candidates have the unfettered opportunity to make their views known so that the
electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their positions on vital
public issues before choosing among them on election day").
32. See, e.g., DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE
FATE OF THE NATION 26-30 (Public Affairs 2007).
33. See infra Part Ill.
larger role than reasoned deliberation in making their decisions.34
Moreover, political candidates, groups, and their consultants have intuited
this fact for some time and generally design their electoral communications
to take advantage of it.35 These developments cast doubt on the validity of
the Court's SDD theory, and raise the question of whether its attendant
doctrines in the area of campaign finance regulation should be revised on the
basis of a more accurate model of the nature of electoral communications
and their impact on American voters. It is to this question that this Essay
will turn after examining the recent research and the insights it provides into
the nature of electoral communications today.
III. THE NEW SCIENCE AND MODERN ELECTORAL COMMUNICATIONS
Within the past couple of decades, the neuroscientist team of Hanna and
Antonio Damasio began studying cases of human brain injuries that left
formerly intelligent and thoughtful individuals with little ability to make
sound judgments even though they retained basic thinking and speaking
skills. 36 This research led Antonio Damasio to publish his seminal work,
Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain,37 in 1994. In that
work, Damasio set forth what is known today as the somatic marker
hypothesis.38 At a very general level, this hypothesis posits that, contrary to
conventional wisdom which held that human cognition was a brain process
that operated largely independent from that organ's processing of feelings
and emotions, cognition in fact utilizes neural networks dedicated to both
reasoning and the experiencing of emotions.39 In other words, Damasio
found that thinking and deliberation are not processes that are separate from
our emotions, but rather draw on our emotional faculties to a significant
extent.
According to Damasio, human memories are largely stored and
organized in the brain's emotional circuits through a process by which
networks of related thoughts, perceptions, images, and ideas are marked or
"tagged" with certain positive or negative emotions. 40  When the brain
engages in cognitive activities such as deliberating on a decision, it retrieves
from memory and utilizes such bundles of thoughts and related perceptions
34. See infra Part Ill.
35. See infra Part III.
36. ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (G.P.
Putnam's Sons 1994).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 165-201.
39. See id.; see also ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN at x-xiii (Penguin Group 2005); WESTEN, supra note 32, at 60-63.
40. See DAMASIO, supra note 36, at 165-201; see also WESTEN, supra note 32, at 3.
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to assist in that process. 4' And when they are so retrieved and utilized, their
emotional tags or markers both guide and bias our cognitive processing of
them, as the thoughts brought into conscious deliberation give rise as well to
their associated feelings. Sometimes these emotions operate on our thoughts
to produce better judgments and decisions, sometimes more irrational ones,
sometimes they operate at a level of conscious awareness, and sometimes at
42
an unconscious one. In short, Damasio's work suggests that emotion is
inextricably bound up in the process of reasoning.
As in other areas of human cognition, Damasio's work has sparked a
plethora of new research, particularly by political scientists, psychologists,
and neuroscientists, in understanding the role played by emotions in voter
information processing and decision-making. In certain studies, various
teams of neurologists and psychologists designed experiments using
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) techniques to watch how our brains
process political information and images. In the most interesting experiment
conducted right before the 2004 elections, Emory University psychology
professor Drew Westen and a team of researchers observed the brains of
committed Republicans and Democrats as they viewed a series of slides
doctored to present incumbent candidate George W. Bush, his opponent
John Kerry, and certain politically-neutral figures, taking inconsistent
positions with different groups to essentially pander for votes. 43 In the
process of deciding that the positions taken by the candidate of the opposing
party and the neutral figures were indeed inconsistent, the subjects utilized
both cognitive and emotional circuitry of their brains. However, in deciding
41. See DAMASIO,supra note 36, at 165-201.
42. See id.
43. See WESTEN, supra note 32, at x-xiv; see also Drew Westen et al., Neural Bases of
Motivated Reasoning: An fMRI Study of Emotional Constraints on Partisan Political Judgment in
the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election, 18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1947-58 (2006). Westen's
work, and particularly the implications he draws from it as set forth in his book The Political Brain,
see supra note 32, has not been free from criticism. See, e.g., David Brooks, Stop Making Sense,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/books/review/Brooks-
t.html. Much of the criticism seems directed at the fact that Westen comes at his subject from an
unapologetically "democratic" or "liberal" viewpoint, urging the Democratic Party to learn from his
book in order to defeat Republican candidates in elections and to change policies sponsored by the
Republican Party (and particularly by the administration of George W. Bush). See, e.g., WESTEN,
supra note 32, at 17-23. While this author takes no position on Westen's political views and
believes a more objective and scholarly presentation of his work might have been more fitting,
certainly the fact that he hopes Democrats will actually use it to achieve political successes seems to
do little to impugn the validity of his findings regarding the mechanisms of political psychology. If
anything, it demonstrates his confidence in those findings.
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that the positions of their own parties' candidates were not inconsistent, the
subjects relied principally on the emotional circuits of their brains. 44
A fact that really surprised the researchers was that after the emotional
circuits of subjects had assisted them to reach false conclusions about their
own candidates, additional circuits associated with feelings of reward lit up
to reinforce their biased reasoning-the same circuits that activate when a
drug addict receives a fix. 45 According to Westen, this discovery adds new
meaning to the term "political junkie. ' ' 46  A similar MRI experiment
conducted by a team of neuroscientists at the University of California at Los
Angeles led one of the researchers to conclude that "the passions swirling
through elections are not driven by a deep commitment to issues. We are
not fighting over the future of our country; we are fighting for our team ....
[A]l1 that really matters is who wears the team uniform. 47
It might be said that these researchers are part of a school of thought that
has developed regarding the role of emotions in decision-making called
"motivated reasoning., 48 At bottom, and consistent with Damasio's work,
this theory holds that, given the way human reasoning utilizes information
stored in memory associated with different emotional markers, when we
deliberate about issues connected with strong emotional preferences we are
unconsciously motivated to retrieve and process information that allows us
to reach conclusions consonant with our emotional biases-as the political
partisans did in the foregoing MRI experiments. 49 Especially in the voting
context, where decisions regarding "issues" depend on complex and
specialized information and are assessed in the context of a low expected
marginal utility of one's vote, voters' decisions are based principally on their
emotional predispositions towards a party (i.e., partisan loyalty) and feelings
generated by a candidate and her campaign about how much a candidate
cares about their interests and values.50 Factual data and other information
incongruent with such feelings are "rationally" processed to strongly bias
conclusions in favor of such emotional commitments.
A related school of thought regarding the role of emotions in voter
decision making, based mainly on empirical research conducted by political
scientists, is called "Affective Intelligence" (Al).51 Although this theory
44. See WESTEN, supra note 32, at xiii-xiv.
45. Id.
46. Id. at xiv.
47. Joshua Freedman, Op-Ed., This is Your Brain on Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at A2 1;
see also Jonas Kaplan et. al., Us Versus Them: Political Attitudes and Party Affiliation Influence
Neural Responses to Faces of Presidential Candidates, NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 45, 55-64 (2007).
48. See, e.g., Westen et al., supra note 43, at 1947-48.
49. See also DAVID REDLAWSK, Emotions and the Processes of Voter Decision Making, in
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION REPORT (2006); WESTEN, supra note 32, at 99-100.
50. See, e.g., WESTEN, supra note 32, at xiv, 90, 99, 115, 120-122.
51. See generally, e.g., MICHAEL MACKUEN ET. AL., The Third Way: The Theory of Affective
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also holds that emotions have a strong role to play in such decisions, Al
proponents are more sanguine about their effects, believing that emotional
influences can result in rational voter decision-making.52 According to Al,
voters normally rely on their emotional predispositions such as partisanship
or ideology to cast votes-which can be a reasonable voting strategy
assuming it has resulted in satisfactory outcomes in the past-unless the
voter is presented with new and unfamiliar information that creates anxiety
which may, in turn, force a more deliberate and reasoned assessment of
information and choices. 53 Thus, one could say, Al attempts to split the
baby between rational-actor and motivated-reasoning models of voter
behavior.
Since Al posits different outcomes tied to different emotional effects
information may have on voters, various experiments have been designed to
test the impact that emotional appeals have on voters. Probably the most
comprehensive study to date, published in 2006 by University of Michigan
political scientist Ted Brader,5 4 has found that emotional appeals in political
advertising can significantly influence voter behavior: appeals to positive
emotions such as enthusiasm or hope motivate voter turnout and
participation in elections, yet do so by strengthening partisan commitments
that increase the polarization of the electorate; 55 appeals to voter fear or
anxiety cause less reliance on prior preferences and increased assessments of
issues and candidates; 56 however, other studies have shown that voters must
be subjected to sustained flows of cognitively incongruent information
before they will move away from emotionally-favored positions. 57 Reason,
then, ultimately may triumph but usually over the longer haul. Studies have
also shown that appeals to anger can depress overall information seeking by
voters, 58 and negative ads in general can discourage voters-and especially
non-partisan, independent voters-from participating in elections at all.5 9
Intelligence and American Democracy, in THE AFFECT EFFECT: DYNAMICS OF EMOTION IN
POLITICAL THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 124-51 (W. Russell Neuman et al. eds., 2007).
52. See id. at 124-29; REDLAWSK, supra note 49, at 1-2.
53. See MACKUEN., supra note 51, at 124-29; REDLAWSK, supra note 49, at 1-2.
54. See TED BRADER, CAMPAIGNING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: How EMOTIONAL APPEALS IN
POLITICAL ADS WORK (University of Chicago Press 2006).
55. Seeid. at 14-15, 143-44, 181-83.
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., REDLAWSK, supra note 49, at 2.
58. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Valentino et al., Is a Worried Citizen a Good Citizen? Emotions,
Political Information Seeking, and Learning via the Internet, 29 POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY No. 2,
264-67 (2008).
59. See generally, e.g., STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: How
Finally, in contrast to conventional wisdom holding that if emotional
appeals work at all, their effectiveness is limited to less educated and less
sophisticated voters, evidence from both lines of research finds that
emotional appeals have the greatest impact on more politically engaged and
aware citizens.60 This is because they are the voters that tend to have the
strongest partisan affiliations. The political disengagement or alienation of
voters, on the other hand, reduces the effect of political advertisements in
general.
In sum, although the new research in this area is not monolithic in its
findings or conclusions, one principle that most of it seems to agree on is
that, although reason and emotion are inherently intertwined in voters'
decision-making processes, emotions appear to play a very influential and
even dominant role. As Westen writes:
[The marketplace of ideas] view of mind and brain couldn't be
further from the truth. In politics, when reason and emotion collide,
emotion invariably wins. Although the marketplace of ideas is a
great place to shop for policies, the marketplace that matters most in
American politics is the marketplace of emotions.6
This research seems to confirm what many have long intuited to be the
case, including political consultants who have developed a cottage industry
assisting political players to develop strategies designed to capitalize on
voters' emotions-mainly through political advertising campaigns on
television and in other media that typically make both cognitive and
emotional appeals but tend to be dominated by the latter.6' The Hillary
Clinton "Red Phone" ad 63 and the Tom Tancredo "Bomb in a Backpack"
ad 64 are good examples of this from the 2008 presidential race (and
specifically from the primary contests of that race). Both ads attempted to
make substantive statements, respectively, about the relative experience of
the candidates or the wisdom of our immigration policies, yet
POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (1997).
60. See, e.g., BRADER, supra note 54, at 14-15, 143-44, 181-83.
61. WESTEN,supra note 32, at 35-36.
62. See, e.g., BRADER, supra note 54, at 147-176, 153 (explaining that while most political ads
reviewed in a comprehensive study contained appeals to both emotion and reason, "the reputation of
political advertising as primarily emotional is well founded: in nearly 72 percent of ads, the appeal to
emotions dominated the appeal to logic. For the most part, the patterns are similar across different
types of races, as appeals to emotion dominate everywhere" (citation omitted)).
63. See, e.g., Orlando Patterson, Op-Ed, The Red Phone in Black and White, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/opinion/l1 patterson.html.
64. See T.W. Famam, Tancredo Ad Links Immigration to Terrorism, WALL ST. J. WASHINGTON
WIRE, Nov. 13, 2007, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2007/11/13/tancredo-ad-links-
immigration-to-terrorism/.
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overwhelmingly used emotional cues designed to appeal to voters'
emotions-here, the emotions of fear and anxiety. As many commentators
have observed, these means of political persuasion are little different than
the means utilized by Madison Avenue advertising firms to market
consumer products.65 It is not surprising, then, that political candidates and
groups draw heavily on Madison Avenue expertise when they hire their
political consultants or design a political advertisement.
66
The effectiveness of these marketing techniques explains why political
advertising, and especially television advertising, has become "the principal
tool of politicians in major elections., 67  Indeed, paying for such "media
buys" and raising the funds necessary for them, are the main reasons why
spending by political campaigns has spiraled upwards at unprecedented rates
in recent decades.68 Such expenditures constitute the bulk of spending by
modem political campaigns.69 Political parties and other interest groups also
spend a substantial amount of their funds on such advertising.7 ° It seems
fair to say, then, that when the Court steadfastly insists on treating campaign
expenditures as the equivalent of political speech, it is in reality giving the
strongest First Amendment protection to communications that, in many
ways, bear more resemblance to commercial advertising than the
"interchange of political ideas" romanticized in its decisions.
65. See, e.g., Alexandra Alter, Reading the Mind Of the Body Politic, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14,
2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI19759511839128473.html?mod=special-page.
campaign2008-leftbox (discussing the trend towards the use of sophisticated commercial marketing
techniques in political advertising, including "neuromarketing" based upon the science discussed in
this Essay and "microtargeting" techniques, as well as quoting an ad consultant asserting that
"[p]olitical marketing is a fairly pure analog to commercial marketing,... I'm looking at a package
of shampoo the same way I'm looking at my next leader").
66. See id.; see also BRADER, supra note 54, at 20 (explaining how "some candidates have taken
a 'Madison Avenue' approach by enlisting the help of companies experienced at product advertising.
During the 1980s and 1990s, however, increased reliance on ads fueled the rise of political
consulting as a profession, complete with a trade association and industry publications. Campaign
ads have since become more sharp-edged and more slickly packaged" (citations omitted)).
67. BRADER, supra note 54, at 20.
68. Id. at 20 (discussing televised political ads and asserting that "[w]hat began with a modest
splash in the 1950s has grown to an electronic flood in recent decades. Television advertising is the
primary cause of the upward spiral in campaign spending, as most candidates for major offices
devote a greater proportion of their budget to airing ads than to any other type of expenditure. The
second largest campaign expense often is fundraising to collect the money needed (largely) for
ads").
69. See id.
70. See id. (asserting that "[i]nterest groups also devote substantial resources to airing ads to
influence candidate elections, ballot propositions, and even policy debates outside of elections").
IV. A MORE COHERENT FREE SPEECH MODEL AND DOCTRINE FOR
ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATIONS
To recap what was said earlier about the theoretical model the Court
applies in campaign finance cases, it bases the strong constitutional
protection provided to electoral communications on an under-theorized
hybrid of Justice Holmes's marketplace of ideas model (under which a free
exchange of ideas is seen as facilitating the discovery of truth) and the
democratic deliberation model championed by Justice Brandeis and
Professor Meiklejohn (pursuant to which speech is protected commensurate
with its capacity to promote intelligent democratic decisions).7" While not
excluding protection for emotional forms of expression, the Court's SDD
theory emphasizes the importance of rational thought, discussion, and
deliberation for achieving these goals.7 2  However, if the political
psychology research discussed above is accurate and continues to be
substantiated by continuing investigation, SDD theory seems inadequate
both because it does not accurately reflect the nature of the communications
it purports to model, and because it reflects an incomplete account of how
voters process those communications and make their electoral decisions.
As to the nature of electoral communications, as just discussed, the bulk
of campaign and related political spending is spent on political
advertisements that consist mainly of communications purposefully crafted
to appeal primarily to voters' emotions and only secondarily to their
deliberative faculties. 3  Thus, the Court's enduring characterization of
communications fostered by campaign contributions and spending as
involving the dissemination of political ideas or debates on important issues
of the day, appears, at best, naive and, at worst, disingenuous. Certainly
some communications fostered by political donations consist of useful
information, ideas, and debate, but on the whole they are increasingly geared
towards eliciting facile emotional responses in potential voters.
Moreover, the new political psychology research tells us that even if
voters had the time, expertise, and motivation to obtain and evaluate the
information and ideas pertinent to important issues, they are still likely to
evaluate them through the lens of their gut feelings. Even when voters do
engage in reasoned assessments about such issues, their emotions are likely
to heavily influence their thinking process.
Accordingly, if the Court's SDD model does not accurately and
completely depict the nature of electoral communications and how they
influence voter decision-making, is there a sounder theoretical and doctrinal
71. See supra notes 3-32 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
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framework for assessing the constitutionality of campaign finance
regulations? A more accurate and complete model of electoral
communications would first include the fact that the bulk of them constitute
sophisticated attempts to elicit desired emotional responses from voters in
order to color their receipt of whatever "subsidiary" substantive information
or message an ad might possess. Moreover, a more accurate model would
reflect the principal findings of the research discussed above. First, it would
recognize the fact that as to the bulk of the electorate committed to a
particular political party or ideology,7 4 emotionally-laden predispositions
will normally determine their decisions about candidates even in the face of
information and rational argument that might dictate a different decision.
7 5
And, second, with respect to independent voters that may be more open to
rational appeals, the model would recognize that their voting choices will
still be strongly influenced by the way their emotions color and affect the
reception and processing of those appeals. 76
This revised model of communications and decision-making in the
electoral context raises the question of whether highly speech-protective
doctrinal rules predicated on the traditional but incomplete rational actor
model are desirable to foster such a marketplace of emotionally-laden
communications and decision-making. The answer would seem to depend
on whether the speech interests at stake, and the competing societal interests
in regulation, remain the same under the old and new models.
As to the relevant speech interests, as discussed earlier, the Court's SDD
model rests principally on the premise that an uninhibited flow of political
information and ideas will generally result in reasoned debate and discussion
that will facilitate good electoral decisions.77 The question then becomes
whether an uninhibited flow of electoral speech that is quite frequently
targeted at appealing to a voter's emotions can similarly be said to facilitate
good electoral decisions. There is reason to be much more skeptical about
this latter proposition.
As noted earlier, certainly emotion and reason are not inherently
opposed to each other; cognitive science has shown that emotional guidance
is an essential ingredient of sound reasoning processes. 78 Moreover, as also
noted, most political appeals involve both emotional and substantive appeals
74. See WESTEN, supra note 32, at x-xiv (estimating that 60-80 percent of the electorate
constitute committed partisans); see also id. at 27, 115.
75. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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even though the former typically predominates. 79  But decisions that are
driven primarily by our feelings are generally thought to be less trustworthy
and sound than those resting primarily on reasoned deliberation-at least
when it comes to decisions that rely on an accurate assessment of objective
factors or conditions, rather than those that are more subjective in character
such as those involving moral or ethical choices.80 The main reason for this,
of course, is that emotions and feelings are not necessarily rational.
Whereas reason is a process by which we use that primarily human faculty
of conscious intelligence to make sense of the world in an orderly,
systematic way-principally utilizing the outer "gray matter" of our brain
which evolved last as part of it becoming a human brain-emotions are
essentially physiological responses to sensory stimuli and perceptions,
powered by lower brain neural systems that evolved early on in animals to
guide them through a potentially dangerous physical environment. 8' Thus,
although reason usually draws upon emotion to assist it in assessing
different decision options, emotion is capable of operating independently of
reason-and frequently does to motivate irrational choices or actions.
8 2
Additionally, given emotion's evolutionary purpose of providing survival
instincts, not surprisingly they often push people towards looking principally
to their self-interest as opposed to looking to the common good of the
community."
Probably most important in the context of electoral communications, recall
that our memories normally organize and store networks of related thoughts,
perceptions, and images with associated emotional markers or tags. When we
think or deliberate on something important to us, we normally call up such
79. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REv. 1, 5 (2007) (in a study of judicial decision-making, asserting that "judges are
predominantly intuitive decision makers, and intuitive judgments are often flawed. To be sure,
intuition can lead to accurate decisions, as Malcolm Gladwell documents in his bestseller, Blink,
while deliberation can lead to error, as any court observer knows. But intuition is generally more
likely than deliberation to lead judges astray") (footnotes omitted); Richard Alleyne, Careful
Deliberation 'Better Than Snap Decisions:' A Trend Towards Trusting to Gut Instinct Rather than
Careful Deliberation Could be "Outright Dangerous" and Lead to Making Worse Choices, New
Research Claims, LONDON TELEGRAPH, Aug. 11, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2538526/Careful-deliberation-better-than-snap-decisions-researh-suggests.htmI (discussing a
new study refuting recent claims about the superiority of gut instinct over deliberation as a basis for
decision-making); accord Deirdre Van Dyk, Gut Decisions May Not be Smart, TIME, Aug. 22, 2008,
available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1835431,00.html.
81. See, e.g., WESTEN, supra note 32, at 45-68.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 26 (observing "the framers of American democracy made clear, like both Plato and
the social contract philosophers, that only through reason can people set aside their self-interested
and parochial desires to make decisions in the common interest. Passions can lead to rapid, poorly
thought-out, self-interested acts, or to the psychology of the mob, inflamed by the emotion of the
moment and capable of turning on anyone in its path" (citation omitted)).
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networks that are related to the subject of our deliberation in order to assist us in
that process. 84 A particular subject, then, can unconsciously activate networks
of related subject associations and their concomitant feeling states. One could
say that we use "reasoning by analogy" to a very significant extent. The
problem is that political consultants and advertisers are aware of this fact, and
frequently try to capitalize on this by using images or music in ads that are
designed to activate chains of related thoughts and feelings that can subtly and
unconsciously bias a viewer against a certain candidate. 85 The Willie Horton ad
aired by supporters of the first President Bush against the democratic candidate
Michael Dukakis in the 1988 presidential race was a good example of this. 8 6 It
purported to make a substantive statement that Dukakis was soft on crime, but
did so by using bleak images of menacing-looking prisoners, and especially an
African-American prisoner with very dark skin and a prominent, overarching
brow line (all underscored by threatening music), to activate a voter's related
mental associations about crime and racial attitudes-including any fears,
anxieties, or prejudices associated therewith.87
Now it is clear that appeals to reason may also be manipulated in the
service of self-interested ends. Consider, for instance, George W. Bush's
protests against Al Gore for his alleged use of "fuzzy math" during their
presidential debates. 88 But unlike questionable emotional appeals, dubious
factual claims are at least subject to verification and rebuttal by reference to
objective or empirical criteria.89 Thus it seems apparent that emotional
appeals are subject to greater abuse than rational ones, and frequently are
used to distort ordinary reasoning processes. These observations lead to the
conclusion that while emotional appeals can and often do have value, the
speech interests at stake in fostering their uninhibited flow in the electoral
context seem appreciably less than fostering an unlimited flow of political
information and ideas under the Court's rational deliberation account of
electoral communications.
On the other side of the First Amendment scale, it appears that at least
some important interests in government regulation, and particularly those
regarding campaign-related expenditure limitations, may be greater under an
84. See, eg.,id. at 83-112.
85. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
86. See WESTEN, supra note 32, at 63-68 (discussing Horton ad).
87. See id.
88. See id. at 31-34.
89. This is illustrated by the proliferation of media programs and websites during the recent
election purporting to verify factual claims made by different candidates and their campaigns. See,
e.g., Anderson Cooper 360: Keeping Them Honest Segments (CNN television broadcast), available
at http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/category/keeping-them-honest (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
emotional primacy account of electoral communications than the Court
found them to be under its deliberative model. Equalizing candidate
spending would appear to be a more compelling interest when the means of
persuasion focus on emotional rather than rational appeals. 90 The largest
spenders are not necessarily fostering the "deliberative good" with
emotionally-driven appeals, and arguments about "buying elections"9' seem
to have more force in such a context. Also, in such an environment there
may be more concern whether good ideas (i.e., those with high "rational
worth") put forth by those with less spending power may nevertheless
receive adequate dissemination and consideration by virtue of their inherent
sense.
Moreover, capping overall campaign-related spending may be more
justifiable under an emotional primacy model. 92 The purported benefits
from uninhibited spending under such an account seem less compelling
when considered against concerns about public cynicism regarding the
influence of money in politics, and the amount of time and resources
expended by campaigns in raising funds. Further, concerns about limiting or
chilling issue advocacy by "independent" political interest groups, in order
to address competing concerns about such groups exercising undue influence
on political races in periods immediately preceding elections,93 may not be
as great under the emotional primacy model. If political advertisements run
by "527 corporations" or similar interest groups, like the National
Organization for Women or the National Rifle Association, are adding more
to the "battle for emotions" than they are the "battle for the mind," there may
well be more reason to limit their influence on races in the run up to an
election (and concomitantly less concern about limiting their "issue
advocacy" during such periods).
Finally, under an emotional primacy account of electoral
communications, there may even be more persuasive reasons for regulating
the nature or size of political contributions in order to address concerns
about corruption stemming from candidate reciprocity. 94  Constraints that
90. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-58 (1976) (rejecting argument that a
"governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individual and groups to influence the
outcome of elections" justifies expenditure limits); see also Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 128 S.
Ct. 2758, 2773-74 (2008).
91. See, e.g., Jeremy Paul, Campaign Reform for the 21" Century: Putting Mouth Where the
Money Is, 30 CoNN. L. REv. 779,781 & n.7 (1998).
92. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54-58 (rejecting asserted justifications for overall campaign
spending limitations and striking them down); accord Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 240-46
(2006) (plurality opinion).
93. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (striking down
application to political interest group of issue advocacy ban during period before election).
94. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 248-53 (striking down limits on campaign contributions that the
Court viewed as being unreasonably low).
412
[Vol. 36: 395, 2009] Campaign Finance Regulation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
might be imposed on such reciprocity by reasoned and principled positions
staked out during a campaign would potentially be weaker under this
account than it would under the deliberative model.
In sum, if empirical support for the electoral "marketplace of
emotions" 95 continues to be substantiated by scientific investigation, it may
be that a rigorously speech-protective standard that unduly ties the
government's hands in addressing the stronger regulatory interests posited
above might be undesirable. The question then becomes: What would be a
preferable doctrinal alternative? A simple and obvious answer seems to
jump out from the Court's campaign finance decisions themselves: to
employ the more flexible "intermediate" standard of review for assessing the
constitutionality of expenditure limitations that the Court now uses to
evaluate the constitutionality of contribution limitations.96 Not only would
that standard give the Court more latitude to recognize the stronger
regulatory interests that the emotional primacy model suggests, but it would
also reflect the more heterogeneous nature of the speech interests bound up
in electoral communications to a more accurate extent than the Court's
current doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that protection for political speech remains at the core
of First Amendment concerns, and this Essay is in no way suggesting that
the government be able to restrict electoral communications on the basis of
whether they appear to carry more of an emotional or rational message. In
the end, this Essay is making a fairly modest proposal that others have
suggested but for different reasons: that it may be desirable for the Court to
employ a more flexible approach to assessing campaign-related spending
limits-similar to that already used in assessing contribution limits-that
allows federal and state legislatures to continue their experimentations with,
and search for, an optimal election scheme. Such an approach seems
especially desirable given the new light that neuroscience and political
psychology is shedding on the manner in which electoral communications
influence voter decision-making.
95. WESTEN, supra note 32, at 35-36.
96. See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2758, 2770-71 (2008) (asserting that
contributions limits "cannot stand unless they are 'closely drawn' to serve a 'sufficiently important
interest'.... When contribution limits are challenged as too restrictive, we have extended a measure
of deference to the judgment of the legislative body that enacted the law" (citations omitted)); see
also supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text,
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